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abstraCt. Grelka Maciej, On the question of knowledge and blindness in Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus.
The article presents comments on the question of knowledge and blindness in Sophocles’ Oedypus Tyrannus. 
The author suggests that part of the lexical data may support the hypothesis of Parmenidean inspiration of the 
tragedy. He claims that it is reasonable when Oedipus charges Teiresias and Creon of conspiracy. He also sug-
gests that Oedipus’ loss of eyes on one hand and the king’s other experiences on the other move him away from 
the category of human beings to the borderland between the worlds of the mortals, the dead and the world of 
divinity. The author of the article also claims that among various interpretations of the tragedy, the knowledge-
oriented one seems to find the most support in lexical data.
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1. INTROdUCTION
Oedipus Tyrannus, the most famous work of Sophocles, is at the same time 
one of the most thoroughly studied Greek tragedies. The problem of knowledge 
and ignorance, seeing and blindness was analysed comparatively broadly and 
precisely in this context. This article is an attempt at giving some additional 
observations and remarks on these well-studied questions.
2. PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUNd
Already in archaic literature we find emphasised distinction between gods 
and human beings as far as the quality of the knowledge possessed is concerned 
– there are some examples for instance in Homer and other early poetry.1 Then, 
1 W. Allan, Tragedy and the early Greek philosophical Tradition, [in:] J. Gregory (ed.), 
a Companion to Greek Tragedy, Oxford 2005, p. 77.
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we can learn from the Presocratics that there is a fundamental difference betwe-
en two kinds of knowledge: the divine knowledge (that is in fact the only true 
one) and the human knowledge. The crucial distinction can be found in the phi-
losophy of Parmenides, who is considered by many scholars as the inspiration 
for the Sophocles: namely, Parmenides distinguishes between the perception and 
the reasoning. This distinction is based on the assumption that our senses may 
be deceived by the things perceived/experienced,2 whereas the reason grasps the 
very essence of reality. Such a point of view was, as W. Allen claims, something 
new and revolutionary for the Greeks.3  
After Teiresias and Oedipus meet we can see in practice how insignificant 
the sensory perception is in terms of knowledge acquisition: blind Teiresias po-
ssesses the real knowledge, while Oedipus is deluded not even by the gods, but 
by his own senses. The consequence of such a situation is the fact that Oedipus 
does not even know who he actually is, which is generally the most basic infor-
mation every human usually possesses. For Parmenides the divine knowledge, 
thus the real knowledge, was the only one that has any significance and at the 
same time the only one that is relevant in terms of wisdom, reasoning and exi-
stence. If we assume that there was any Parmenidean inspiration in Sophocles’ 
works, then this radical tone can be find in every part of the tragedy.
As an argument for the Parmenidean inspiration some scholars point out that 
there are some parallels between Parmenides’ philosophy and Sophocles’ trag-
edy. Namely, Parmenides depicts our world as the universe where the mortals 
are immersed in some kind of space that is created out of sensory stimuli. These 
mortals are e„dÒtej oÙdšn. Whereas Oedipus, while speaking against Teiresias, 
depicts himself as the one who solved the riddle of Sphinx despite being mhdn 
e„dèj4 (396–397): 
[...] ¢ll' ™gë molèn, 
Ð mhdn e„dëj O„d…pouj œpaus£ nin.
Admittedly one could say that this is such a widespread or even conventional 
phrase that it would be unreasonable to look for analogies here, but even if there 
are no truly parallel expressions we could still try to search through the text for 
some examples of this particular participle. Thus besides mhdn e„dèj of Oedi-
2 Which of these terms we choose depends on the assumed concept of functionning of the sens-
es. Some of them can be found for example in: F. Frontisi-ducroux, Oko, wzrok, spojrzenie – kilka 
greckich wyobrażeń, transl. W. Michera, [in:] W. Lengauer, L. Trzcionkowski (eds), antropologia 
antyku greckiego. Zagadnienia i wybór tekstów, Warszawa 2011.
3 W. Allan, op. cit., pp. 77–78.
4 M.W. Champlin, Oedipus Tyrannus and the problem of Knowledge, “The Classical Journal” 
vol. 64, n. 8, 5, 1969, p. 344.
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pus, we can find oÙdn e„dèj concerning the servant who run away from the 
place, where Laios was killed (118–119):
qn»iskousi g£r, pl¾n ej tij, Öj fÒb, fugèn 
ïn ede pl¾n n oÙdn ec' e„dëj fr£sai,
then the messanger’s oÙk e„dèj on Oedipus
ð pa‹, kalîj e dÁloj oÙk e„dèj t… dr©ij (1008),
and finally servant’s e„dëj oÙdšn describing the messenger:
lšgei g¦r e„dëj oÙdšn, ¢ll' ¥llwj pone‹ (1151).
And on the other hand we have Teieresias describing himself as e„dèj (317–
318):
[...] taàta g¦r kalîj ™gè
e„dèj diëles': oÙ g¦r ¨n deàr' ƒkÒmhn,
and gods who are e„dÒtej in the words of the choir:
¢ll' 'Ð mn oân ZeÝj Ó t' ¢pÒllwn xunetoˆ kaˆ t¦ brotîn e„dÒtej (499).
Parmenidean or not, this regularity in connotations seems at least interesting, 
as regards above-mentioned questions.
3. TEXTUAL REMARKS
R. Chodkowski distinguishes two main ways of interpreting Oedipus Tyran-
nus, as far as the main theme of the tragedy is concerned.5 The first one could be 
marked “the tragedy about infallibility (S. Srebrny) or power (C. M. Bowra) of 
divinity”.6 The second one could be labelled “the tragedy of arriving at the truth” 
(B. Knox, S. Said, M. Maślanka-Soro). We are less inclined to accept the first 
interpretation and in the subsequent parts we will adduce some arguments sup-
porting the second one, but we will also offer some general remarks on the qu-
estion of human and divine knowledge and its acquisition in Sophocles’ tragedy.
5 Sofokles, Król edyp, transl., intr. and comment. R. Chodkowski, Lublin 2009, pp. 64–65.
6 In the broader sense, which means that this idea contains both all the divine beings and the 
Oracle.
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3.1. HUMAN KNOWLEdGE. OEdIPUS HIMSELF 
The sources of the human knowledge acquisition are indicated neither by 
Oedipus himself nor by the context (his ignorance):7
f»mhn ¢koÚsaj e‡t' ¢p' ¢ndrÕj osq£ tou (43).
When the priest is uttering these words he deprives them of any markedness 
that they would undoubtedly have if Oedipus spoke them. Oedipus relies on the 
knowledge acquired by means of visual perception and this knowledge provides 
him the illusion of control over the situation, but at the same time he actually 
has no reliable information about his own life. It is even more paradoxical in 
the face of the fact that he accuses other people of ignorance.8 The allegation 
can be brought because the one who brings it possesses all the sensory faculties 
(especially the visual ones) – Oedipus is deeply convinced of the superiority of 
the knowledge acquired by means of visual perception. 
Moreover, we can say that Laius was killed by Oedipus not because he did 
not know who he see and in what circumstances they actually are, but because 
he insisted on acting as if he did know, as R. L. Kane points out.9 Thus, metapho-
rical blindness is much worse than true blindness, and analogically, the scholar 
continues, “intelligence exercized in a perceptual vacuum can be worse than 
mere ignorance”.10 Actually, the essence of the tragedy is in the fact that human 
knowledge “cannot compensate for the gaps in man’s flawed perspective”.11
And from this point of view we think that when C. M. Bowra says that irri-
tated Oedipus is “incapable of a truly balanced or rational judgement”,12 he is 
wrong because the problem is not in judgement itself, but in the knowledge on 
which the reasoning is based. Namely, the knowledge of Oedipus is unsufficient 
to judge the situation right, but at the same time is sufficient to bring allegations 
of conspiracy (regardless of their veracity).13
Certain ironic phrases of Oedipus seem to be particularly significant as re-
gards the question of perception and knowledge: the one where he claims that he 
knows Laius because he has heard about him, but he has not seen him himself:14
 7 Cf. Similar thought in M.W. Champlin, op. cit., pp. 337–338.
 8 W. Kaufmann, Tragedy and philosophy, Princeton 1968, p. 117.
 9 R.L. Kane, prophecy and perception in the Oedipus rex, “Transactions of the American 
Philological Association”, vol. 105, 1975, p. 190.
10 R.L. Kane, op. cit., p. 208.
11 Ibidem.
12 C.M. Bowra, sophoclean Tragedy, Oxford 1944, p. 193.
13 The same when A. Waldock says that Oedipus is precipitate – we suppose that taking Oedi-
pus’ knowledge into consideration such conjectures were reasonable, even if eventually not true – 
A.J.A. Waldock, sophocles. The Dramatist, Cambridge 1951, p. 144.
14 There are some places in the text that, according to F. Ahl, could show that Oedipus knows 
about Laius more the he actually said he know (for example vv. 265–268):
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œxoid' ¢koÚwn: oÙ g¦r e„se‹dÒn gš pw (105),
or later, where he said that he has heard about the murder, but noone has seen 
the men who has seen it:
½kousa k¢gè. tÕn d' „dÒnt' oÙdeˆj Ðr©i (293).15
Another clue that we should understand Oedipus’ ignorance in terms of 
blindness we can find in the very conclusion of the tragedy, where the choir 
says that “noone can be seen happy” (1528–1530, the key word here, and in the 
whole tragedy, as we will show later, is „de‹n):
éste qnhtÕn Ônt' ™ke…nhn t¾n teleuta…en „de‹n 
¹mšran ™piskopoànta mhdšn' Ñlb…zein, prˆn ¨n 
tšrma toà b…ou per£shi mhdn ¢lgeinÕn paqèn.
Unfortunately, such a significant sentence (at least as far as the lexis and the 
place in the whole tragedy is concerned) is often more or less deprived of this 
“visual” connotation after having been translated, like, for example in these two 
interpretations, the older one by david Greene:16
Look upon that last day always. Count no mortal happy till 
he has passed the final limit of his life secure from pain.
and the newer one by david Mulroy:17
Thus we learn how necessary seeing the final day is for judging mortals blest.
Hapiness means ending life without being crushed by pain.
A valuable remark of C. M. Bowra, that from the legal perspective Oedipus 
would be regarded as innocent because he acted in ignorance,18 seems to support 
Øpermacoàmai, k¢pˆ p£nt' ¢f…xomai, 
zhtîn tÕn aÙtÒceira toà fÒnou labe‹n, 
tù Labdake…wi paidˆ Poludèrou te kaˆ 
toà prÒsqe K£dmou toà p£lai t' `Ag»noroj.
but we did not know from where this knowledge has came, F. Ahl, Oedipus and Tiresias, [in:] 
H. Bloom (ed.), Bloom’s Modern Critical interpretations: Oedipus rex, New York 2007, p. 110. 
M. W. Champlin says Oedipus “wishes to, give the impression of a man as watchful as Argus” – 
M.W. Champlin, op. cit., p. 329.
15 Codd.; R.d. dawe accepted lectio: ½kousa k¢gè. tÕn d drînt' oÙdeˆj Ðr©i.
16 Sophocles, Oedipus the King, transl. d. Greene, Chicago 1991. Translation first published 
in 1942.
17 Sophocles, Oedipus rex, transl. d. Mulroy, Madison 2011.
18 C.M. Bowra, op. cit., p. 145.
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the “knowledge” interpretation as well: in such a case the centre of gravity is 
moved from the question of guilt in general to the problem of guilt in terms of 
divine law.19 But later C. M. Bowra makes a supposition that Oedipus was pu-
nished not for the homicide itself, but for being generally arrogant and proud,20 
which seems to be too simple an explanation for such a complicated and conte-
xt-rich case.
But on the other hand, a particularly convincing argument against the inter-
pretation in terms of guilt in general is given by C. H. Whitman. He said that “if 
Sophocles had wanted us to consider the problem of right and wrong, he would 
have dramatized the scene at the crossroads. Instead he has dramatized the se-
arch for the murderer”, and thus the action of the tragedy is “devoted to the effort 
to draw truth out of the uncertainty and ignorance”.21 
As regards the question of guilt, it is also worth pointing out that blinding 
was in ancient times a punishment for an infringement of the laws concerning 
sexual sphere,22 and on the other hand, a punishment for the men who have came 
into possession of the forbidden knowledge (for example regarding some sacred 
mysteries). 
3.2. dIVINE KNOWLEdGE. OEdIPUS ANd TEIRESIAS.
In Greek literature there are two groups of people that are recurrently men-
tioned in the context of blindness: poets and prophets23: Teiresias is probably the 
most famous among blind prophets and he could be the sui generis archetype 
example of this group. But before talking about Teiresias we will start with some 
more general remarks on the interdependence of blindness, prophecy and divine 
knowledge.
On one hand, blindness, especially connected with old age, was described in 
terms of helplessness and dependence. For example Oedipus at Colonus is an 
impressive picture of an old, blind, helpless man. But on the other hand it was 
an element of conventional wisdom that there are things visible for the blind 
19 In other words, from the question of guilt in terms of human-instuted law to the question of 
guilt in terms of natural law.
20 C.M. Bowra, op. cit.
21 C.H. Whitman, sophocles. a study of Heroic Humanism, Cambridge (Mass.) 1951, p. 125.
22 Plato, for example, regarded incest as “the most shameful of shameful things” and add that 
it would be right for Oedipus to wish to kill himself – C.M. Bowra, op. cit., p. 169.
23 R.G.A. Buxton, Blindness and limits: sophokles and the logic of Myth, “The Journal of 
Hellenic Studies”, vol. 100, Centennary Issue, 1980, pp. 23–24. Very often these two categories 
were embodied in one and the same person. It is also very interesting that from among all gods 
only Themis was usually depicted as unseeing (but probably not blind) and only Plutus was some-
times described as blinded by dzeus.
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that are invisible to the people who can see. Avoiding “distracting” influence 
of the eyesight they developed memorising skills and dialectics better than the 
seeing ones, hence widespread belief that they had supernatural prophetic abi-
lities. That was one of the reasons why the position of blind people in Greek 
society was significantly better than that of the people with other kinds of phy-
sical disability.24 
We can also count among these prophetic capabilities the assumed unusual 
ability of identifying mental states of other people. This supposed ability would 
be especially well noticeable in the scene of the encounter of Teiresias and Oedi-
pus: the prophet, although also vexed, skillfully manipulates Oedipus without 
being able to see the king’s face, solely by taking advantage of his knowledge 
(320 and sqq.).
But this compensational dependence is twofold mutual. Namely, gift of 
prophecy compensates the blindness, but simultaneously if one has the gift of 
prophecy, can not have the ability of seeing.25 And from another point of view, 
the compensation may be regarded as something positive, as it was generally 
considered above, but also as something threatening: firstly, the eye was consi-
dered as not only a passive receptor, but also as an active organ26 (it is of course 
true that the blind do not see, but that does not mean that their disabled eyes 
cannot cast a spell on somebody). Secondly, people who have gained the divine 
knowledge are often hard to understand, which can cause anxiety, like in the 
case of Oedipus:
`Wj p£nt' ¥gan a„nikt¦ k¢safÁ lšgeij (439).
But the blindness itself can also be regarded as something threatening, only 
because of the association with the divine intervention and gods’ punishment:27 
in Oedipus at Colonnus blinded Oedipus unintentionally frightened the elders’ 
choir, because they fear gods’ wrath (150 and sqq.):
'E», ¢laîn Ñmm£twn
«ra kaˆ Ãsqa fut£lmioj; dusa…wn 
makra…wn q', Ós' ™peik£sai.
'All' oÙ m¦n œn g' ™moˆ
24 E. Wesołowska, antyczna postać ślepca, [w:] I. Mikołajczyk (red.), sapere aude. Księga 
pamiątkowa dla prof. Mariana szarmacha, Toruń 2004, p. 317. Another major reason, why po-
sition of the blind was relatively good in Greece, was, as I think, the fact that blindness is not as 
conspicuous as other physical disabilities: humans tend to mark as more peripheral these elements 
of the category “human”, who are physically more distinguishable from the others.
25 Similar thought in: F. Frontisi-ducroux, op. cit., p. 428.
26 Ibidem, pp. 427–429.
27 Sofokles, Tragedie. Tom i, transl., intr. and comment. R. Chodkowski, Lublin 2009, p. 418, 
n. 10.
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prosq»shi t£sd' ¢r£j. 
etc. [...].
At this point I would like to apply the information from the previous parts of 
this paper to the issue of prophecy. Let us begin by stating that human knowledge 
is acquired in an active, intentional way. Human knowledge is an achievement of 
the intelectual force of the human being, as Ch. Sagal points out. The true, divine 
knowledge is acquired unintentionally, is unpredictable, it “happens”.28 And as 
many unexpected things, it is connected with misfortune or even with calamity. 
And so it happened in Oedipus Tyrannus.
In the culminating point of the tragedy (1369 and sqq.) Oedipus acquired 
the true knowledge, but at the cost of losing the ability to see. This could be 
interpreted twofold, taking acquisition of knowledge or physical blinding as 
a starting point for the interpretation. On one hand Oedipus gained true divine 
knowledge having been isolated from the visual side the external reality (simi-
larly to Teiresias) and became disinterested29 in human knowledge once he had 
the true one.
What is more, while it is true that the very tragedy of Oedipus is in some 
ways distinctive and very unique,30 it is Oedipus himself, being “no more than, 
and no less than, a man”, as R. Buxton writes,31 that could be an incarnation of 
human blindness in general.32 I would like to add some remarks to this interpre-
tation. 
First of all we think that the above-cited claim would be applicable only 
when describing Oedipus before he realised who he was and what he has done. 
The moment his eyes were speared out is a ceasura: there is physically33 virtually 
the same Oedipus on both sides of this line, but qualitatively, there are two rela-
tively separate beings (or qualities). The act of spearing out is symbolical and at 
the same time constitutive for this distinction.
Oedipus before the caesura is sagacious, proud (or arrogant), relying on sen-
sual perception, in short: entirely human, in general: typical of Sophoclean trage-
28 Ch. Segal, life’s Tragic shape: plot, Design, and Destiny, [in:] H. Bloom (ed.), Bloom’s 
Modern Critical interpretations: Oedipus rex, New York 2007, p. 120.
29 Simultaneously or not, depending on personal interpretation.
30 Like, for example, in G.M. Kirkwood: “[tragical] irony [in Oedipus Tyrannus] might al-
most better be called Oedipodean than Sophoclean, so exclusively it is applied to the verbal irony 
of this one drama” – G. M. Kirkwood, a study of sophoclean Drama, Ithaca 1958, pp. 247–
–248.
31 R.G.A. Buxton, op. cit., pp. 23–24.
32 Expressed indirectly by W. Kaufmann op. cit., p. 20. The same idea is expressed more 
explicitly by M. Maślanka-Soro (M. Maślanka-Soro, sofokles i jego twórczość dramatyczna, [in:] 
H. Podbielski (ed.), literatura Grecji starożytnej. Tom I: epika–liryka–dramat, Lublin 2005, pp. 
741–746).
33 Or quantitatively, analogically to the mentioned below term qualitatively.
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dy34. What have the encounter with Teiresias and the act of spearing out changed 
in his life? They not only made Oedipus conscious and equipped him with the 
true, divine knowledge but also distanced him from the world of human beings.
Seeing in Greek world connotes living, deprivation of eyesight automati-
cally means separation from the human world35. This separation is carried out 
twofold: horizontally and vertically. Horizontally it means literal separation: 
 Teiresias lived away from inhabited areas36 and so will do Oedipus in Oedipus at 
Colonus. Vertical separation has a more metaphorical reading. It is also carried 
out twofold, but this time in two separate directions: downwards and upwards. 
downwards direction means becoming closer to death and as such it is as-
sociated with the problem of guilt: as T. Zieliński says, deprivation of eyesight 
is a punishment more terrible than the death itslef; it is the deprivation of the 
source of all joies de vivre – the daylight37. Upwards direction means becoming 
closer to divinity. Throughout the literature, Teiresias is often characterised as 
“divine” prophet, despite the fact that he is only a human and he does not even 
meet the requirements of the Greek ideal of a divine being. Oedipus in Oedipus 
at Colonus is explicitely associated with the divine power because his tomb pro-
tected the entire Attic land (1760–1767): 
'W pa‹dej, ¢pe‹pen ™moˆ ke‹noj
m»te pel£zein ™j toÚsde tÒpouj
m»t' ™pifwne‹n mhdšna qnhtîn
q»khn ƒer¦n ¿n ke‹noj œcei.
Kaˆ taàt£ m' œfh pr£ssonta kakîn
cèran ›xein a„™n ¥lupon.
Taàt' oân œkluen da…mwn ¹mîn
cç p£nt' ¢…wn DiÕj “Orkoj. 
And last but not least, the most obvious divine aspect of this situation: ha-
ving a share in the true divine knowledge (extended in case of Teiresias to the 
prophetic powers). 
But there is one more factor related to the question at hand. If we assume 
that every human experience makes a human being closer to the centre of the 
“human being” cognitive category we can readily admit that each tragic expe-
rience also makes Oedipus closer to the aforementioned centre and somewhat 
closer to the idea of “everyman” (which would be in agreement with some of 
the interpretations mentioned above, n. 31). But something essentially different 
happens in the tragedy: after the “critical mass” of experiences is reached, the 
34 As A. Waldock says, “it is the very mark of Sophoclean drama that the conflicts it presents 
are human” – A.J.A. Waldock, op. cit., p. 150.
35 F. Frontisi-ducroux, op. cit., p. 428.
36 T. Zieliński, sofokles i jego twórczość tragiczna, Kraków 1928, p. 150.
37 Ibidem, p. 161.
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person affected by them is more or less instantly moved to the periphery of the 
category of “human beings”. Moreover, to the particular periphery where the ca-
tegories “human beings”, “divine beings” and “dead beings”38 permeate through 
each other. Thus, paradoxically, what moves the character to the divinity is the 
entirety of his human-typical experiences.
4. LEXICAL REMARKS
The name Oedipus is never mentioned in the tragedy together with the verb 
from which it probably originates – o„dšw, except for the one ethymological 
suggestion (1035–1036):
OI. DeinÒn g' Ôneidoj sparg£nwn ¢neilÒmhn. 
AG. “Wst' çnom£sqhj ™k tÚchj taÚthj Öj e‹ 
But, as was pointed out among others by B. Knox or C. Calame, it appears 
relatively often with the root -#id-,39 common for the many words from the se-
mantic field of seeing-knowing,40 represented by two verbs: edon, which means 
“I see”, and oda, originally perfectum of edon: “I have seen”, later reinterpret-
ed as “I know”.41 In the Polish language verbs widzieć (“to see”) and wiedzieć 
(“to know”) became formally independent and nowadays they are ethymologi-
cally transparent for the native speakers. But it seems that in the Greek language 
these two forms were probably perceived as strongly related, at least among the 
people who, like Sophocles, had superior linguistic competence. If that is true, 
we could consider Oedipus Tyrannus an excellent example of skillful usage of 
these two verbs in a single context.
If we interpret Oedypus Tyrannus as a conflict between the divine knowled-
ge and the human knowledge acquired by the senses, lines of particular charac-
ters in the tragedy should be differentiated in terms of words used or semantic 
fields from which the words were drawn. And so it is if we analyse the tragedy 
itself: 
38 We think that in fact categories “divine beings” and “dead beings” are quite closely related, 
at least from the point of view of the mortals.
39 W. Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 112; C. Calame, Vision, blindness and mask, [in:] M. K. Silk (ed.), 
Tragedy and the tragic: Greek theater and beyond, Oxford 1995, p. 24.
40 P. Chantraine, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque. Histoire des mots, Paris 
1968, p. 317. In the Polish language semantic field of widzieć-wiedzieć sounds much better becau-
se of the common origins of these stems.
41 It is necessary to say that there are also hypotheses that originate these verbs from two dif-
ferent PIE roots, but it is not the topic of the article and i will assume the common origin of these 
verbs especially, that this point of view is definitely dominant among scholars.








Ðr£w 30 2 2 7 4 14 1
e„sor£w 5 1 2 1 1
edon 17 5 10 1 1
e„se‹don 6 2 1 3
Ðp£w + 
edon 
47 2 2 12 4 24 1 2
e„sor£w + 
e„s‹ddon
11 1 2 3 1 4
oda 47 1 2 9 2 9 2 15 7
œxoida 3 1 2
sÚnoida 3 2 1
k£toida 5 2 3
leÚssw 2 1 1
gignèskw 11 2 1 4 1 3
skopšw 7 2 3 1 1
bl„špw 12 2 7 2 1
ÑfqalmÒj 
+ Ômma 
10 1 7 1 1
Throughout the text, -#id-/-ora- words are overrepresented, and it is usually 
Oedipus who utters them. There are numerous examples where others direct 
them at Oedipus as well. The fact that the ambiguous root -#id- is much more 
prevalent than the other words from the seeing-knowing semantic field (blšpw, 
skopšw, leÚssw, gignèskw, ™p…stamai etc.) does not seem accidental. The 
choir also employs these words rather frequently – it is not surprising if we 
realise that the choir represents both the divine and the human knowledge42 in 
tragedy. What seems more significant is that Teiresias’ utterances, even though 
relatively lengthy and numerous, contain few seeing-knowing words.
Comparing this table with Oedipus at Colonus’ frequency statistics can lead 
us to some interesting conclusions: 
42 R. L. Kane, op. cit., p. 93. The halfway position of choir is visible often when he hesitate 
what is true, like in 483 and sqq.:
Dein¦ m™n oân, dein¦ tar£ssei sofÕj o„wnoqštaj,
oÜte dokoànt' oÜt' ¢pof£skonq'· Ó ti lšxw d' ¢porî :















Ðr£w 31 2 4 6 2 1 3  843 1 4
e„sor£w 7 1 1  544




40 2 8 10 2 1 3  8 1 4
e„sor£w + 
e„s‹ddon
7 1 1  5
oda 34 3 2 7 1 1 1345 2 5
œxoida 7 2 1  4
sÚnoida 1 1
k£toida 2 1  1
leÚssw 5 1 2 1  1
gignèskw 10 1 1 2  3 3
skopšw 3 1 1 1
blšpw 7 1 1 1  346 1
ÑfqalmÒj 
+ Ômma 
16 8 2 1 1  3 1
The high correspondence may be interpreted in two ways. Either Oedipus 
at Colonus is as much oriented on the questions of knowledge and seeing as 
Oedipus Tyrannus, which is, in our opinion, less likely, because this problem is 
brought up noticeably less often in the context of Oedipus at Colonus. Or maybe 
these words simply were not as frequent as we think, which seems especially 
probable once we consider the frequency of words from this small table:
Oedipus Tyrannus 
(1530 vv.)








Ðr£w 30 31 35 23 26
edon 17 9 28 11 22
oda 47 34 40 38 30
gignèskw 11 10 6 6 3
blšpw 12 7 5 5 6
43 Mainly second- or third-person narration or phrases like: fwnÁi g¦r Ðrî (138), le…pomai 
g¦r ™n tîi m¾ dÚnasqai m¾d’ Ðr©n, duo‹n kako‹n (495–456).
44 There is no first-person narration.
45 Rare first-person narration.
46 Lack of first-person narration.
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We suppose that the high frequency of seeing-knowing words in the case of 
Oedipus is simply a result of Oedipus dominating the tragedy. The frequency of 
seeing-knowing words is relatively high in all the above-mentioned works of 
Sophocles and it may be a cultural difference: concentration on the visual per-
ception and high appreciation of eyesight are both characteristic of the ancient 
Greek culture or more generally of the Indo-European cultures.47
But it still does not change the fact that the question of the acquisition of 
knowledge in Oedipus Tyrannus is one of the main (if not the main at all) topics 
of that exceptionally interesting work: the reason for this, as far as the lexis is 
concerned, is not the frequency throughout the text, but the frequency in culmi-
nating points of the tragedy: 1371 and sqq.:
'Egë g¦r oÙk od' Ômmasin po…oij blšpwn
patšra pot' ¨n prose‹don e„j “Aidou molèn,
oÙd' aâ t£lainan mhtšr', oŒn ™moˆ duo‹n
œrg' ™stˆ kre…sson' ¢gcÒnhj e„rgasmšna.
'All' ¹ tšknwn dÁt' Ôyij Ãn ™f…meroj,
blastoàs' Ópwj œblaste, prosleÚssein ™mo…;
OÙ dÁta to‹j g' ™mo‹sin Ñfqalmo‹j pote: 
[...]
Toi£nd' ™gë khl‹da mhnÚsaj ™m¾n
Ñrqo‹j œmellon Ômmasin toÚtouj Ðr©n; 
[...].
and the above-mentioned ending, 1524–1530:
'W p£traj Q»bhj œnoikoi, leÚsset', O„d…pouj Óde,
Öj t¦ kle…n' a„n…gmat' ½idei kaˆ kr£tistoj Ãn ¢n»r,
Óst…j oÙ z»lwi politîn kaˆ tÚcaij ™piblšpwn,
e„j Óson klÚdwna deinÁj sumfor©j ™l»luqen,
éste qnhtÕn Ônt' ™ke…nhn t¾n teleuta…en „de‹n 
¹mšran ™piskopoànta mhdšn' Ñlb…zein, prˆn ¨n 
tšrma toà b…ou per£shi mhdn ¢lgeinÕn paqèn. 
5. CONCLUSIONS
 – Parts of the lexical data may support the opinion that there are Parmenidean 
inspirations in Sophocles’ tragedies.
 – Oedipus relies on the knowledge acquired by means of visual perception 
47 There is an enormous disproportion between the number of reconstructed common IE roots 
for eyesight and for other senses (d.Q. Adams, J.P. Mallory, The Oxford introduction to proto-
indo-european and proto-indo-european World, Oxford 2006, p. 349).
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and this knowledge gives him the illusion of control over the situation, but 
at the same time he is ignorant of basic facts about his own life. He is so de-
eply convinced of the superiority of this kind of knowledge (called “human 
knowledge”, as opposed to true “divine knowledge”) that he accuses Creon 
and Teiresias of conspiracy. But in contrast to some scholars, we believe that 
from the Oedipus’ perspective these allegations are reasonable. 
 – Oedipus acquired the true knowledge, but at the cost of losing the ability 
to see. Loss of his eyes on one hand and his other experiences on the other 
move him away from the category of human beings to the borderland betwe-
en the worlds of the mortals, the dead and the world of divinity.
 – Among various interpretations of the tragedy, the knowledge-oriented one 
seems to find the most support in lexical data, however not by means of high 
frequency of lexical items concerning seeing and knowledge throughout the 
text, but by high concentration of them in culminating points of the tragedy.
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